This paper presents the results of a literature review in regard to Social Media and participation. Besides that, to understand the meaning and impact of Social Media on elections, we show field results from the 2010 and 2011 elections in the Netherlands. There are several challenges when it comes to engaging people in party politics. The current findings in literature show us that previous efforts to shape public participation with prior Internet tools did not meet expectations. With Social Media this could change, because participation seems to be the key concept that explains the difference between ‘old’ web and ‘new’ Social Media. In the Netherlands, Social Media did not significantly influence voting behaviour during the local elections (2010/2011). But, during the national elections (2010), politicians with higher Social Media engagement got relatively more votes within most political parties. In conclusion, we propose a future research agenda to study how political parties could benefit from Social Media to reinvent and improve the way they work with their members and volunteers. Notice: © IFIP, 2011. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here by permission of IFIP for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011, Volume 6847/2011, 25-35, Boston: Springer.
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This article attempts to explore the main impulses that might have led to the destruction of Buddha statues by Taliban in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan. Drawing on existing literature, and anecdotal evidence, this article suggests that the main impulses that have led to destruction are rather linked to the overall political context of that time (i.e., political iconoclasm) rather than to pure Islamic iconoclasm or an explicit condition of disharmony in heritage (i.e., dissonant heritage). First, the Taliban did not consider the statues as "their" cultural heritage. The act of destruction, therefore, cannot be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics but rather to the political-religious ideology imported by Taliban from outside of the country. Secondly, it seemed that Mullah Omar was viewing the statues as a revenue source at the beginning and as a political bargain chip at the end. In both circumstances, religion seems not to have played the main role. Lastly, the destruction seems a political iconoclasm-that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political act. The Taliban and especially their external allies were very well aware of the consequences of the act of destruction. It seems implausible to suggest that there were no religion and/or culture in play when ordering the destruction of the statues. The latter is the least what this article aims for. However, to conclude that the destruction was solely triggered by theological and cultural factors might also be improbable. The author does not, in any way, attempt to rationalize the act of destruction, let alone justify the barbaric act.
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The research examines junk news, followers of problematic sources as well as artificial amplification on Instagram during the 2019 Dutch provincial and European parliamentary elections. First, this study looks at the circulation of junk content in high-engagement political spaces on Instagram. Second, it takes up the question of the mainstreaming of Dutch junk news providers by looking at the intersection between the followers of Dutch political entities and those of junk news sources. Third, it looks at the presence of artificial engagement tactics (specifically fake followers) employed by Dutch political entities and news sources on Instagram. In all it was found that Dutch political Instagram is a relatively healthy space, but not for all issues or political entities.
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